Town of #Tasil, #Daraa under full invasion. #Syria

Tasil, Daraa: security and shabiha are conducting an invasion campaign and burning some shops and private property of citizens in the town.

  • Military aircraft are doing low-altitude flights above the town.
  • Security forces have launched and carried out the security operation in the town since last Wednesday up until today.
  • They launched a detention campaign where more than 50 men got arrested; one of them was Dr. Arshad Al-Qaddah.
  • A house-to-house raiding campaign of all the homes and public places in the town was launched. The pharmacies, clinics, commercial shops and private properties were subotaged amid sporadic gunfire and extensive deployment of fully-equipped security members and thugs.
  • Snipers were deployed on the rooftops all around the town.

US embassy cable: SARG officials at every level lie. They are not embarrassed to be caught. #Syria #Assad

6. (S/NF) Vanity and Self-preservation: The President’s self-image plays a disproportionate role in policy formulation and diplomatic activity. Meetings, visits, trips abroad that enhance his respectability and prestige are pursued; encounters that may involve negotiations or difficult debate are declined or delegated to subordinates. The President responds with anger if he finds himself challenged by visitors, but not until after the meeting. He seems to avoid direct confrontation. When engaged in summit diplomacy, he often seeks to include allies to bolster his confidence (e.g., Quadripartite Summit in September 2008, Riyadh Summit in April 2009). His foreign policy subordinates are all “employees” without constituencies or influence independent of the President’s favor. Their overriding concern when engaging foreigners is to avoid the appearance of overstepping or violating their instructions. They are particularly cautious in the presence of other Syrians; requests to meet one-on-one often yield more expansive and candid responses.

7. (S/NF) Deceit: SARG officials at every level lie. They persist in a lie even in the face of evidence to the contrary. They are not embarrassed to be caught in a lie. While lower level officials often lie to avoid potential punitive action from their own government, senior level officials generally lie when they deem a topic too “dangerous” to discuss (e.g., Al-Kibar, IAEA) or when they have not yet determined whether or how to respond (FFN, Hezbollah arms supplies, etc). When a senior SARG official is lying, the key challenge is not demonstrating the lack of veracity but discovering the true reasons for it.

via wikileaks.org

URGENT: Video statement from the sieged people of IDLEB, SYRIA. #ramadanmassacre #mar15 #Idleb

This video from came in from Idleb, Syria, yesterday. The small city of Idleb has been surrounded by 70 tanks. The Syrian Army has put the bodies of 50 dead soldiers in the Idleb Hospital. As the video says, they know the citizens there will be blamed as violent gang members and terrorists responsible for the deaths of these soldiers - soldiers who were likely killed for refusing to shoot on unarmed civilians. 

What the people there don’t know is that the representatives of UN Security Council India, Brazil S. Africa arrive on a ‘fact finding’ mission for UN Security Council today.

Please help get this video as much attention as possible. Retweet it and reblog it. It’s going to be hard with the London riots getting most of the attention but if we succeed we can actually save lives here, because this will be used as an excuse for yet another massacre.

8/8/2011 An important statement by the sieged people of IDLEB, SYRIA

88_2011_An_important_statement_by_the_sieged_people_of_IDLEB,_SYRIA.mp4 Watch on Posterous

 

WikiLeaks: Bush, Obama Passed on Sanctioning Syrian Insiders | Common Dreams

WASHINGTON — Two U.S. administrations declined in recent years to place sanctions on Syrian officials who now are involved in that country’s harsh crackdown on dissidents, despite the officials’ involvement in crushing internal opposition previously, according to secret State Department cables obtained by WikiLeaks.

The struggle continues … demonstrators shout slogans against Syrian President Bashar al-Assad in front of the Syrian Embassy in Turkey. (Photo: Reuters) In one instance, the top diplomat at the U.S. Embassy in Damascus asked the State Department in 2007 to impose sanctions on Ali Mamluk, the chief of intelligence for Syrian President Bashar Assad.

“The role of the organization he heads in suppressing internal dissent is publicly known in Syria and stating as much in our statement would resonate well here,” wrote Michael Corbin, the embassy’s charge d’affaires.

But no action was taken against Mamluk until this April, after security forces had killed scores of civilians in the Syrian town of Deraa in protests that have since spread to much of the country.

In the same cable, Corbin opposed sanctions for Mohammad Suleiman, who at the time was a special Assad adviser for arms procurement and strategic weapons. Corbin argued that Suleiman’s activities weren’t well-known enough that the Treasury Department could impose the sanctions without revealing classified information.

“His activities are not widely known, which will make it difficult to obtain unclassified material” needed for the Treasury Department to cite when sanctioning Suleiman, Corbin wrote.

Suleiman never was sanctioned. On Aug. 1, 2008, a sniper killed him in the Syrian coastal town of Tartous. Syria blamed Israel’s Mossad intelligence agency but offered no proof. A secret cable dated April 9, 2009, offers another possibility: that Suleiman was killed because he had $80 million in cash in the basement of one of his homes, which investigators who were looking into his slaying later found.

How to deal with Assad’s inner circle clearly has been a difficult problem for the administrations of Presidents George W. Bush and Barack Obama, according to the cables, part of the vast trove of State Department communications that WikiLeaks has shared with McClatchy and other news organizations.

Despite suggestions as long ago as 2006 that Assad was falling short on promises to open his country’s political system, neither administration was willing to take firm action against his closest advisers, though such sanctions — which would have prohibited U.S. citizens and companies from doing business with them — often were discussed, the cables show.

That same ambiguity exists today, with the Obama administration refusing to call for Assad to leave office, even as the White House regularly denounces the harsh crackdown in which as many as 1,600 people are thought to have died. The most recent White House statement came Sunday, after Syrian troops moved into the restive city of Hama and killed an estimated 75 people.

A Jan. 4, 2006, confidential cable from the previous charge d’affaires in Damascus, Stephen Seche, spelled out why the Bush administration was reluctant to target Assad’s inner circle.

“Most Syrians we talk to believe that President Assad still represents their best hope for change without instability. It is their fear of instability that stops the majority of Syrians from pushing harder for internal change,” Seche wrote.

The hesitancy to pressure Assad’s inner circle as a way to bring political change to Syria that’s reflected in the cables recalls the conflict between how officials today describe the Libyan regime of Moammar Gadhafi and the way Gadhafi’s regime was portrayed in diplomatic cables before the current uprising in that country.

As McClatchy outlined in a story in April, those cables often portrayed Gadhafi’s regime as moving toward greater openness and described Gadhafi’s son Saif as one of the main proponents of greater respect for human rights. The International Criminal Court indicted Saif Gadhafi on war crimes charges in June, along with his father.

Corbin raised the issue of sanctions in several cables, including one classified secret and dated Jan. 24, 2008, in which he suggested that the U.S. target four men who make and move money for Assad.

The four included Assad’s father-in-law, Fawas Arkhas; financier Zufair Sahloul, who was said to be able to “move $10 million anywhere in the world in 24 hours”; and Assad’s uncle and financial adviser Mohammad Makhlouf. The U.S. still has made no move to sanction them, although the European Union sanctioned Makhlouf on Tuesday.

The fourth person Corbin suggested the U.S. move against was Nabil al Kuzbari, whom Corbin identified as an Assad confidant who ran investment schemes on behalf of Syria’s top business families. The U.S. moved to sanction him only this May.

Despite its refusal to move in some cases, the Bush administration did impose sanctions on some Assad confidants, including Assad’s cousin and economic power broker Rami Makhlouf, after the embassy in Damascus suggested that they be targeted.

A secret cable sent Jan. 31, 2008, described Rami Makhlouf as the “poster boy” of corruption, squeezing out legitimate businesses and benefiting from his family ties to make money in banking, the power sector and cellular-phone service contracting. Sanctions were imposed the next month.

The Bush administration in November 2007 sanctioned his brother Hafiz, a colonel and head of intelligence in Damascus, for Syria’s meddling in Lebanon. In May, the Obama administration modified his sanction to include his alleged role in stifling dissent in Syria.

But to date, the United States hasn’t sanctioned the family patriarch, Mohammad Makhlouf.

The Bush administration also imposed sanctions on Assad’s brother-in-law, Asif Shawkat, in January 2006. Shawkat, who’s married to Assad’s sister Bushra, headed Syrian intelligence at the time, but he fell from grace after the death of Lebanese terrorist mastermind Imad Mugniyah, whom the U.S. sought for killing Navy diver Robert Stethem during the 1985 hijacking of a TWA jet.

A car bomb blew Mugniyah to pieces on Feb. 12, 2008, in Damascus. A secret cable dated April 14, 2008, suggested that Assad stripped Shawkat of some of his power in response to the assassination, which proved embarrassing since Syria had denied for years that Mugniyah was in the country.

Theories abound about who killed Mugniyah and why, ranging from Shawkat, whose office was near the bomb site, to Assad’s violent brother Mahir. Known as the family enforcer, Mahir Assad escaped sanction until late April, when the Obama administration targeted him through an executive order.

In a secret cable from Paris, dated Sept. 12, 2008, the U.S. Embassy cites a French security adviser as saying that Mahir Assad, described as “a bit of a wild man and determined to increase his power,” may have killed Suleiman and possibly Mugniyah. The motive was effectively doing away with headaches from people who “knew too much” about the activities of the Assad family.

Another secret cable — from Damascus on June 3, 2009 — paints an unflattering portrait of the Western-educated leader of Syria. The memo was sent as the Obama administration considered ways the U.S. government could engage Assad and take a less hostile tack.

“Syrian President Bashar al-Assad is neither as shrewd nor as long-winded as his father but he, too, prefers to engage diplomatically on a level of abstraction that seems designed to frustrate any direct challenge to Syria’s behavior,” noted the cable, sent by a new charge d’affaires, Maura Connelly. “Bashar’s vanity represents another Achilles heel: the degree to which USG visitors add to his consequence to some degree affects the prospects for a successful meeting.”

The cable suggested that playing to Assad’s “intellectual pretensions is one stratagem for gaining his confidence and acquiescence; it may be time-consuming but could well produce results.”

If U.S. diplomats under Obama sought to butter up Assad, the Bush administration tried a hostile approach designed to keep him diplomatically off balance.

A Dec. 13, 2006, secret cable from Damascus by charge d’affaires William Roebuck suggested that the diplomats try to sully Assad’s international image since he was preoccupied with how the outside world viewed him.

“Actions that cause Bashar to lose balance and increase his insecurity are in our interest because his inexperience and his regime’s extremely small decision-making circle make him prone to diplomatic stumbles that can weaken him domestically and regionally,” the cable said. “While the consequences of his mistakes are hard to predict and the benefits may vary, if we are prepared to move quickly to take advantage of opportunities that may open up, we may directly impact regime behavior where it matters — Bashar and his inner circle.”

Yet, as the documents show, both administrations chose not to sanction much of his inner circle until the Arab Spring spread this year to Syria. The Obama administration and European allies haven’t yet declared Assad an illegitimate leader who must go, as they did with Libya’s Gadhafi.

READ THE CABLES

Cable: To pressure Syria’s Assad go after his ‘money-men’

MORE FROM MCCLATCHY

WikiLeaks cables show U.S. took softer line toward Libya

State Department cables reveal U.S. thirst for all things Iranian

WikiLeaks: Saudi crackdown on Shiites has echoes in Bahrain

WikiLeaks cables show that it was all about the oil

© 2011 McClatchy Newspapers
via commondreams.org

US Embassy Cable: (2008) al-Asad tacitly acknowledged that he is not preventing arms from transiting Syria to Hizballah. #Syria

Classified By: Political Minister-Counselor Kathleen H. Allegrone, reas ons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (S) Summary: “We think Syria is delivering on the key dossier,” French Presidency Advisor for the Middle East Boris Boillon said December 5, as he recapped his November 30 visit to Damascus with Presidency Secretary General Claude Gueant and NSA-equivalent Jean-David Levitte. In contrast to his colleagues at the MFA (ref A), Boillon predicted that Syria would name an ambassador to Beirut by the end of the year, although he conceded that the Syrians might delay until the first few days of January “just to show that they are independent.” Such a delay would not begin to affect the relationship unless it extended beyond President Sarkozy’s January 6 visit to Lebanon and, even more gravely, beyond Lebanese President Michel Sleiman’s state visit to Paris in March. He added that Lebanese diplomat Michel Khoury has been tapped to be Lebanon’s ambassador to Syria. Boillon agreed with Syrian President Bashar al-Asad’s argument that Sleiman should not run an independent bloc of candidates in Lebanon’s parliamentary elections on the grounds that Lebanon’s president should remain above politics. In a startling admission, al-Asad tacitly acknowledged that he is not preventing arms from transiting Syria to Hizballah, although the French read his comment as an indication that Syria would end weapons shipments if it were to conclude a peace agreement with Israel. Boillon said the French team encouraged the Syrians to be transparent with the IAEA, adding that it would be “catastrophic” for Syria’s dispute with the IAEA to escalate. End summary.
via cablegatesearch.net

Six Videos of clashes from last weekend in Syria, available for download. Warning: some are graphic and distressing.

MothershotYouTube_-_‫جوره_الشياح_حمص_1-7-_2011‬‎.flv Watch on Posterous
YouTube_-_‪Syria_-_20110605_-_Idleb_-_Four_dead_bodies_in_a_.mp4 Watch on Posterous
YouTube_-_‫ادلب_هجوم_الأمن_والشبيحة_وكأنهم_في_معركة_جمعة_أرح.flv Watch on Posterous
YouTube_-_‫حلب_جامع_امنة_قمع_الشبيحة_للمصلين_في_الجامع_و_ضرب.mp4 Watch on Posterous
YouTube_-_سوريا_حمص_مجازر_تلبيسه_Syria_Homs_massacres_te.flv Watch on Posterous
YouTube_-_‫فيديو٠٠٠١._(1).‏3gp‬‎.flv Watch on Posterous

 

LEAKED #Syrian Intelligence plan to deal with Uprising #deraa #assad #arableaks - Interzone Uprizings

Syrian Gov Secret Plan Page 1

Credit: ArabLeaks

We have recently received Top Secret documents written by the Syrian Arab Republic’s General Directorate Of The Intelligence Services detailing the techniques they will use to push back against the popular uprising. These documents prove that the Syrian government has been waging a systematic campaign of disinformation and brutality against its citezens. They also outline specific PSYOPS techniques they use to manipulate the publics perception.

Some notable PSYOPS reccomendations are:

  • Forbidding all media outlets from going to the places of unrest, and punishing anyone broadcasting any news which doesn’t serve the state - and not showing any tolerance in this matter.
  • In case the opposition manages to take pictures or film any videos, the security cell should prepare scenes from the protests and insert loopholes in them, so they can broadcast on state media and subsequently exposed so as to remove credibility from the films/videos of the opposition.
  • Intense Media campaign accusing protesters and opponents of subservience to Israel, Saudi Arabia and the USA. In the case of killings, the security cell should repeatedly accuse armed or radical gangs, and claim that the security apparatus and army are contributing to the protection of order, stability and the people.
  • Connecting the protests with personalities who are detested among the Syrian public, such as known Saudi and Lebanese personalities [possibly alluding to March 14] and connecting all of them with Zionism and the USA. There is a plan prepared being prepared by a security cell, which will be introduced/implemented in a suitable, timed way on questionable sites under the name of “Bandar Sultan’s plan”, which is believable and convincing.

The text below is the full translation of the documents originally drafted April 30’th 2011 . The Arabic transcription will be included afterwards along with the original image files.

If you would like to download the full archive via i2ptorrent the magnet link is included below:

magnet:?xt=urn:btih:3963d5e6535189f52c1e56e141a82b525982ff2e&tr=http://tracker2.postman.i2p/announce.php

ENGLISH TRANSLATION

== PAGE 1 ==

Syrian Arab Republic

General Directorate Of The Intelligence Services

No. / / 22334A124

Date / / 30-4-2011

Without Record / Top Secret

General Directorate Of The Intelligence Services / Top Secret

Detailed Plan for implementation:

Subject:

There is a rising sentiment among a specific group aiming at imitating what happened in Tunisia and Egypt by making use of the current economic conditions in the state and the international environment, which is currently supportive of popular movments. This sentiment might increase after what happened in the city of Dar’aa a few days ago.

Evaluation:

It is imperative to make use of the previous experience in dealing with the hostile Muslim Brotherhood movement, and to learn from the mistakes of the Tunisian and Egyptian regime, especially since they neutralized the power of the army and Republican Guard from the beginning, and allowed media outlets to cover every movement until matters got out of control.

In the detailed plan, things won’t get to point where the regime or state is endangered or the current continuation [of rule] is under threat, and the final result will be passage of many tiresome months, and after that the regime emerge more powerful indefinitely.

The minature security panel consisting of A.S. [likely to be Asef Shawkat], M.N., H.K., A.M., H.M. covened at 23/3/2011 regarding opposition protests and discussed the matter from all its aspects (Security, Economic, Political) and has set the following measures: It is stressed that the treatment of the matter requires shared security-media-political-economic work in the least.

Detailed plan:

The plan depends on thee complementary factors: Media [PR], security and field perfroamnce, political and economic.

Media/PR factor:

- Connecting the protests with personalities who are detested among the Syrian public, such as known Saudi and Lebanese personalities [possibly alluding to March 14] and connecting all of them with Zionism and the USA. There is a plan prepared being prepared by a security cell, which will be introduced/implemented in a suitable, timed way on questionable sites under the name of “Bandar Sultan’s plan”, which is believable and convincing.

- Intense Media campaign accusing protesters and opponents of subservience to Israel, Saudi Arabia and the USA. In the case of killings, the security cell should repeatedly accuse armed or radical gangs, and claim that the security apparatus and army are contributing to the protection of order, stability and the people.

- Indirect media campaign on TV and privately-owned channels about sectarian strife/disorder, and instilling fear of the Muslim Brotherhood in Christians and Druze, warning them of the reprisals they might face by them if they did not participate in ending the protests. Enlisting the Alawites in the coastal regions so they can defend ‘their’ regime and lives, which are going to be threatend by Sunni radicalism.

- Instructing some security units in all security agencies to work within Facebook to respond to and disrupt the communication of the opponents, labeling them as opponents of the regime with fake names/nicknames, posting views/opinions which damage the reputation of the opposition, and possibly also exposing ‘schemes and plans’ hostile to the president and the state.

- Forbidding all media outlets from going to the places of unrest, and punishing anyone broadcasting any news which doesn’t serve the state - and not showing any tolerance in this matter.

- In case the opposition manages to take pictures or film any videos, the security cell should prepare scenes from the protests and insert loopholes in them, so they can broadcast on state media and subsequently exposed so as to remove credibility from the films/videos of the opposition.

 

== PAGE 2 ====================================

- When being prevented from providing coverage or intervening, the media often relies on eyewitnesses, and we expect that a few of them would dare to call satellite channels to provide their testimony - therefore it is the responsibility of the ‘media/press intelligence’ cell to prepare some eyewitnesses from ‘professional security agents’ to contact satellite channels and provide them with exaggerated testimony, with the prerequisite that it should contain loopholes, so it can be directly exposed in our State Media and also on satellite channels in order to ‘damage the credibility of any eyewitnesses’.

- Instructing some members of the people’s assembly to respond to the ‘opponents’ and ‘vandalists’, and to provide them with some points and specifics on how to respond to them.

- Instructing some personalities from the state apparatus located in the place of the protests to respond to the protesters and ‘opponents’.

- In case the protests are too intense and hard to ignore, it is inevitable that the ‘opposition’ should be turned into local demands specific to the region only.

- Sending a convoy of cars carrying pictures of the president, with the possibility of adding the Syrian flag, with the help of security units, their friends, children of government officials and army officers inside cities, and providing these cars with sirens similar to those equipped on ambulances, to create awe within the spirits of bypassers and residents.

- Inviting some moderates within the opposition to [interviews] on State TV, with the possibility of using ‘shaming’ and some courtesy to persuade them, for this dilutes their demands and turns them to trivial, simple demands they’re asking the president to fulfill for them. This is also useful for creating splits in the protective and opposing factions within the oppostion.

- The announcement of strict instructions by the Ministry Of Education to ‘warn’ schools and pupils about the usage of the Internet and Facebook.

- Instructing some artists loyal to us or ‘captured’ by us to talk to [people in] the places where the protests are happening or the opposition in accordance to what we provide them with.

About the security cells and field performance:

- No tolerance of any harm to the image of the highest symbol [of the state] (possibly referring to the president), because this, if tolerated, will increase the opposition’s ability to cross all lines.

- It is expected that the opposition’s gatherings will be held in places with high population density in order to draw attention and encourage others to join them, and here it’s needed to ‘blockade/barricade’ and isolate the place as much as possible and to sneak in security units in civilian clothes in between the protesters to create disputes and foil/disperse the gathering as soon as possible, and also to arrest some of the ‘vandalists’ if needed.

- Instructing the ‘Information Security’ branch in the administration and in the centre for scientific studies to cooperate with the two mobile phone providers to monitor the cell- and landline phones of some expected and known ‘inciteful’ and opposition personalities.

- Calling and ‘summoning’ the youth to instill a fear of participation [in the protests] in them, arresting some of them and announcing a ‘general conscription’ in the armed forces in order to exhaust [the strength] of the youths and activists with visiting the recruitment offices.

- Exhausting the strength of the opponents and symbols of the opposition with lawsuits of all shapes and forms, slandering their moral and religious reputation, and it is possible to use some means prepared specifically for this purpose.

- Forbidding prominent members of the opposition from all travel, regardless of reason.

- Instructing the Military Security branch to monitor all mid- and high-level command in the army, especially Sunni ones.

- In the case of violent confrontations between army units and protesters, it is required to issue a clear order to cease all fire [from the side of the army], with the order not being applicable to trained Security Forces, and units belonging to the ‘serba’ and ‘souda’ companies, and to use snipers within these companies in a non-apparent way to prevent the localization of the source of the fire - also to increase cover: There is no problem in killing some units and officers of the army, as this is useful in increasing the animosity of the army towards the protesters.

- In any place the protests go out of control:

- Isolation of the place with security and army forces, and cutting off electricity, communications, and internet.

- Arresting some influential personalities from this place, and if the situation is critical - killing them.

- Making use of some smugglers and criminals, flooding the place with them and creating a state of chaos.

- Sending trained security forces in civilian clothing to the place of the protests, who should attempt to convince the protesters of using weaponary against the army and security forces.

- Deploying security forces and units from the ‘serba’ and ‘souda’ companies with snipers in organised campaigns during the protests, with the number of fatalities not exceeding 20 every time, because this might expose the matter and make a case for outside intervention

== PAGE 3 ====================================
- Depolying Druze and Christian units/officers in the army to the places of protest and tempting them to defend themselves, also depolying units of the army based in remote regions to prevent cases of refusal, rebellion, or hesitation.

- If a critical or potentially dangerous situation develops, getting everyone to choose between security and stability, or the freedoms they’re demanding, and here they will choose their security and safety. This can be implemented with some assassinations [of individuals] belonging to different sects and clans, or detonating some places of worship in regions with intense protests.
Economic factor:

- Planning/Sending out a massive demonstration in favour of the president before his speech in front of the people’s assembly, so his speech would be a response to the demands of the masses and nothing more. Strict instructions should be issued here to government institutions, syndicates, unions and schools to gather employees and pupils and issue new slogans/banners to them.
The president’s anticipated speech:

- Delaying the speech as much as possible, as this delay is an expression of the state’s power and its immunity to the current events - it also contributes to clearing the image and setting the amount of political movement needed. Any change we might be forced to make must be presented as if we were the ones who started it and called for it.
- Giving a picture stable impression of the regime.

Measures that can be presented in the president’s speech before the people’s assembly:
- Increasing the salary of government and public sector employees after consulting the minister of treasury and putting plans for returning the economic stability with 3 months, especially if this raise might destabilise the current economic interests.

- Promising to create new jobs to distribute among the governorates.
- Lowering the price of some essential goods.

- Partial governmental change and exposure of the corruption of some ministers - this requires one security panel to decide which ministers will be sacrificed.
- Lowering the price of mobile phone calls officially, with the possibility of reclaiming part of the losses through hidden costs.

- Giving personal and public privileges to some Muslim and Christian religious figures who are close to the regime and using them to slander the protesters and the opposition, and asking them to use convinsing verses from the Qu’ran or specific hadiths discouraging them from participating in the current events.
- Sending official figures acceptable to the people to talk with opposition and to ask them to accept the political leadership’s attempts to converse with them - some of them will accept immediately, some will accept with reservations, and some will reject the matter entirely. This is useful in creating disputes and splits within the opposition and preventing them from appearing as an effective, monolithic actor which can be influential in the protest movement.

- Responding to some of the Kurdish demands regarding citizenship, but only if that happens in a way that doesn’t change anything in the state and society or disrupts the current balances - and this response is only to conscript them and suppress their acceptance of foreign intervention if the opposition protests intensify - for the northeastern region is the only problem in regard to this issue as the other regions are not expect to accept such a thing.
- Instructing Syrian embassies overseas, as well as the foreign ministry to reassure the USA and the European states, and reminding that the Golan front might be suspectible to instability if the radicals succeed and gain control.

- Instructing the Syrian embassy in all states to monitor Syrians and their behaviour - the foreign ministry is to act in this matter.
- Preparing security and media teams for implementation as soon as possible and as secretly as possible.

Note: The entirety of the detailed plan is not to be put in the hands of anyone or any team of the operation, but should be split into branches and sections
ARABIC TRANSCRIPTION
الجمهورية العربية السورية
إدارة المخابرات العامة
الرقم
التاريخ
بدون تسجيل - سري للغاية
إدارة المخابرات العامة - سري جداً
الخطة العامة للتثبيت:
الموضوع:
هناك توجه متزايد لدى فئة ضئيلة نحو تقليد ما حدث في تونس ومصر بالاستفادة من الظروف الاقتصادية في القطر والجو الخارجي المناصر للتحركات الشعبية. وهذا التوجه ربما يزداد بعد ما جرى في مدينة درعا منذ أيام قليلة.
التقييم:
لا بد من الاستفادة من التجربة الماضية في التعامل مع حركة الاخوان المسلمين العدائية, والاستفادة من اخطاء النظام التونسي والمصري خاصة أنهما قاما بتحييد قوة الجيش والحرس الجمهوري منذ البداية وسمحوا لوسائل الإعلام لتغطية كل تحرك حتى خرجت الأمور عن السيطرة.
لن تصل الأمور باستخدام الطرق المرسومة في الخطة التفصيلية إلى حالة خطرة على النظام العام والقطر أو تهدد الاستمرارية القائمة وستكون الحصيلة الإجمالية مرور عدة أشهر متعبة وبعدها يخرج النظام أقوى إلى أجل غير محدد.
اجتمعت اللجنة الأمنية المصغرة المؤلفة من كل من أ ش, م ن, ح خ , ع م, ح م, بتاريخ 23 3 2011 فيما يخص الاحتجاجات والتظاهرات المعادية وناقشت الأمر من جميع جوانبه الأمنية والسياسية والإعلامية ووضعت التدابير والإجراءات التالية: وثم التأكيد أن المعالجة تتطلب اشراك ثلاثة انواع من العمل : أمني وإعلامي وسياسي اقتصادي بالحدود الدنيا.
الخطة التفصيلية:
تعتمد الخطة على ثلاثة عناصر متكاملة: إعلامي - أمني وأداء ميداني – سياسي اقتصادي.
العنصر الإعلامي:
- ربط التظاهرات والاحتجاجات المعادية للنظام بالشخصيات مكروهة عند السوريين كالشخصيات السعودية واللبنانية المعروفة وربط الجميع بالصهيونية وأمريكا. هناك خطة تقوم خلية أمنية بإعدادها وإدخالها بالطرق المناسبة بشكل مؤقت في مواقع مشبوهة باسم خطة بندر بن سلطان قابلة للتصديق والإقناع.
- حملة إعلامية مكثفة تتهم المحتجين والمعادين بالعمالة للسعودية وإسرائيل وأمريكا, وفي حالة حدوث عمليات قتل يجب على الخلية الأمنية الإعلامية تكرار اتهام عصابات مسلحة أو متطرفة وأن الأجهزة الأمنية والجيش يساهمان في حفظ الأمن والاستقرار والأهالي.
- حملة إعلامية غير مباشرة في التلفزيون والقنوات الخاصة والشوارع حول الفتنة الطائفية وتخويف المسيحيين والدروز من الإخوان المسلمين والتطرف الذي سيواجهونه إذا لم يشاركوا في إنهاء الاحتجاجات وفي منطقة الساحل استنفار العلوين ليدافعوا عن نظامهم وحياتهم التي ستصبح مهددة من قبل التطرف السني.
- تكليف بعض العناصر الأمنية في كافة الأجهزة الأمنية بالعمل من خلال الفيسبووك للرد والتشويش على المعادين, وجعل بعضهم يأخذ صفة معادية للنظام بأسماء مستعارة وطرح أساليب وتوجهات تسيء إلى سمعة المعارضين, وكذلك يمكن لهم كشف الأساليب والمخططات المعادية للسيد الرئيس والقطر.
- منع وسائل الإعلام من التواجد في أماكن الشغب, ومعاقبة من ينقل أي خبر لا يخدم القطر, وعدم إظهار أي تهاون في هذا الأمر.
- في حال تمكن المعادون من تصوير أو نقل أية فيدوهات أو صورة ينبغي قيام الخلية الأمنية الإعلامية بتجهيز مشاهد عن الاحتجاجات ووضع ثغرات فيها يمكن بعدها عرضها على الإعلام السوري والشبكات الإعلامية الأخرى وفضح هذه الثغرات وبالتالي يعمم هذا في ذهن الجميع لإفقاد أشرطة وصور المعادين مصداقيتها.
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اضغط على الصورة لمشاهدة الصفحة الثانية
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- تعتمد وسائل الإعلام عندما يمنع المراسلين فيها عن التغطية والتدخل على شهود العيان, ونتوقع أن يتجرأ البعض ويتصلوا بالفضائيات كشهود عيان، لذلك يقع على عاتق الخلية الأمنية الإعلامية تجهيز بعض شهود العيان من العناصر الأمنية المحترفة للتحدث مع الفضائيات على أن يكون شهادتهم مبالغة وثغرات يمكن فضحها مباشرة في إعلامنا ومع الفضائيات، وبالتالي تصبح قضية شهود العيان ورقة محروقة.

- تكليف بعض أعضاء مجلس الشعب بمهام للرد على المعادين والمخربين، ووضع بعض النقاط والمحددات لهم في طريقة الرد.
- تكليف بعض الشخصيات في أجهزة الدولة من مناطق الاحتجاج ذاتها بالرد على المحتجين والمعادين.
- في حال كانت حالة العداء شديدة ويصعب التغاضي عنها، لا بد من تحويل العداء إلى مجرد مطالب محلية خاصة بالمنطقة وحسب.
- تسيير قوافل سيارات تحمل صور السيد رئيس الجمهورية، ويمكن أن يضاف لها العلم السوري، من قبل عناصر الأمن وأصدقائهم وأولاد المسؤولين والضبا داخل المدن، وتزويد بعض هذه السيارات بزمامير ممائلة لسيارات الإسعاف لخلق الرهبة في نفوس المارين والسكان.
- استضافة بعض المعارضين في التلفزيون السوري، ويمكن استخدام التخجيل وشي من اللباقة معهم، فهذا يخفف مطالبهم ويحولها إلى مطالب بسيطة يطلبون من السيد الرئيس تقديمها لهم، كما لهذا الأمر فائدة في خلق شروخ داخل الرؤوس الحامية والمعادية في المعارضة.
- إصدار وزارة التربية لتعليمات مشددة وتحذيرات للمدارس والطلاب حول استخدام الفيسبووك.
- تكليف بعض الفنانين المعروفين بولائهم أو الممسوكين من قبلنا بالحديث مع مناطق الاحتجاج أو بالرد على المعارضين والمحتجين بحسب ما نضعه لهم.
العنصر الأمني والأداء الميداني:
- عدم التهاون في المس بالرمز الأعلى مهما كانت الأثمان، لأن ذلك إن تم السكوت عنه سيزيد من قدرة المعادين على تجاوز جميع الخطوط.
- يتوقع أن تكون تجمعات المعادين والمحتجين في أماكن الاكتظاظ السكاني من أجل لفت الانتباه وطمعا منهم في تشجيع الآخرين على الانضمام لهم، وهنا يجب محاصرة المكان قدر الإمكان والتغطية عليهم وإدخال عناصر أمنية بلباس مدني بين المحتجين لإثارة الخلاف بينهم وإفشال التجمع وفضه بأسرع وقت ممكن، وإذا اضطر الأمر اعتقال بعض العناصر الفاعلة المخربة بينهم.
- تكليف فرع المعلومات في الإدارة وفي مركز الأبحاث العلمية بالتعاون مع شبكتي المحمول بمراقبة جدية لخطوط الهواتف الأرضية والمحمولة لبعض الشخصيات المحرضة والمعادية المعروفة والمتوقعة.
- حالات استدعاء وجلب للشباب لخلق الرهبة والتردد عندهم بالمشاركة، واعتقال البعض منهم وإعلان تعبئة عامة في الجيش والقوات المسلحة لإرهاق الشباب والناشطين بمراجعة شعب التجنيد.
- إرهاق المعارضين والرموز بالدعاوى القضائية من جميع الأشكال وتشويه سمعتهم الأخلاقية والدينية، ويمكن استخدام وسائل معدة مسبقاً في هذا الشأن.
- عدم السماح بالسفر للشخصيات المؤثرة في المعارضة السورية في الداخل تحت أي ظرف كان.
- قيام فرع الأمن العسكري برقابة صارمة داخل الجيش والقوات المسلحة على القيادات المتوسطة والعليا، خاصة القيادات السنية.

- لدى حصول مواجهات بين عناصر الجيش والمحتجين والمعادين يجب إصدار أمر واضح بعدم إطلاق النار من قبل الجيش، ويبقى ذلك محصوراً بالعناصر الأمنية المدربة وعناصر الكتيبتين السرية والسوداء، واستخدام القناصة في الكتيبتين بشكل غير مكشوف لمنع تحديد مصدر إطلاق النار، وزيادة في التمويه لا بأس من قتل بعض عناصر وضباط الجيش، وهذا يفيد في استنفار عداء الجيش ضد المحتجين.
- أي مكان تخرج فيه الاحتجاجات العدائية عن السيطرة:
عزل المكان ومحاصرته بقوى الأمن والجيش، وقطع الكهرباء والاتصالات وشبكة الانترنت.
اعتقال بعض الشخصيات المؤثرة من هذا المكان، وإن كانت الظروف حرجة قتلها.
استخدام بعض المهربين والمجرمين وإغراق المكان بهم وخلق حالة من الفوضى
إدخال عناصر أمنية مدربة بلباس مدني ضمن منطقة الاحتجاج ومحاولاتهم إقناع المحتجين باستخدام السلاح ضد قوات الجيش والأمن
دخول قوات الأمن وعناصر الكتيبتين السرية والسوداء مع القناصين في حملات منظمة أثناء الاحتجاجات ولكن يجب ألا يزيد عدد القتلى عن عشرين في كل مرة، لأن ذلك قد يجعل الأمر مفضوحاً وقد يجر إلى حالة تدخل خارجية

=========================
اضغط على الصورة لمشاهدة الصفحة الثالثة
- استخدام عناصر و ضباط في الجيش من المسيحيين و الدروز في الدخول لمناطق الاحتجاج المعادي و إغراؤهم بالدفاع عن أنفسهم, و كذلك استخدام وحدات من الجيش عناصرها بعيدة عن مناطق الاحتجاج منعاً لحالات الرفض و التمرد و التردد في تنفيذ الأوامر.
- في حال وصلت الأمور إلى حالة حرجة و خطرة جر الجميع للاختيار بين الأمن و الاستقرار و الحريات التي يطالبون بها, و سيختارون هنا بقاء الأمن و سلامتهم. و هذا يمكن تنفيذه ببعض الاغتيالات من طوائف و عشائر مختلفة أو تفجير بعض أماكن العبادة في أماكن التوتر الكبيرة.

العنصر السياسي الاقتصادي:
- إخراج مسيرة حاشدة و مؤيدة للسيد رئيس الجمهورية قبل خطابه أمام مجلس الشعب كي يكون الخطاب استجابة لمطالب الجماهير وحسب. وهنا يجب إصدار تعليمات صارمة للمؤسسات الحكومية و النقابات و المدارس بحشد الموظفين و الطلاب, و توزيع شعارات جديدة عليهم.
خطاب الرسيد رئيس الجمهورية المتوقع:
تأجيل الخطاب قدر المستطاع فهذا التأجيل تعبير عن قوة الدولة و عدم اهتمامها و اكتراثها بما قد يحدث, كما يساهم في جلاء الصورة و تحديد مقدار التحرك السياسي و الإعلامي و الميداني المطلوب.
أي تغيير قد نضطر له يجب إظهاره بأننا نحن من بدأنا به و نادينا إليه.
إعطاء صورة عن تماسك كل أركان النظام.

- الإجراءات التي يمكن عرضها في الخطاب الرئاسي امام مجلس الشعب:
زيادة رواتب العاملين في الدولة و القطاع الحكومي بعد استشارة السيد وزير المالية ووضع خطة لعودة الاستقرار المالي خلال مدة 3 شهور, خاصة أن هذه الزيادة قد تؤدي لارباك المصالح الاقتصادية المستقرة اليوم.
إطلاق وعد بخلق فرص عمل جديدة موزعة على المحافظات.
مقدار من التخفيض الممكن على سعر المازوت و بعض السلع الاساسية
تغيير حكومي جزئي وفضح فساد بعض الوزراء/ هذا يحتاج للجنة أمنية واحدة تحتار من الوزراء الذين يجب التضحية بهم/ يساهم في اقناع المواطنين بجدية تحرك القيادة السياسية نحو تحركات إصلاحية.
تخفيض تعرفة مكالمات الهاتف المحمول رسمياً يمكن استعادة قسم منها من خلال الرسوم غير الملحوظة.
- تقديم بعض المزايا الشخصية و العامة لرجال الدين المسلمين و المسيحيين المقربين من النظام و استخدامهم في التوجه للناس وذم المحتجين و المعادين للنظام, و الطلب منهم الاستعانة بآيات و أحاديث مقنعة تبعدهم عن المشاركة فيما يجري.
- إرسال شخصيات رسمية مقبولة نسبياً إلى المعارضة الداخلية تطرح عليهم قبول القيادة السياسية للتحاور معهم, و طبعاً سيقبل البعض منهم مباشرة, وبعضهم سيقبل بشروط و بعضهم سيرفض, وهذا مفيد في ظهور جدال و خلاف مستمر وعدم ظهورهم ككتلة متوافقة و مؤثرة, و إبعادهم عن التأثير في التحرك الاحتجاجي.

- الاستجابة لبعض المطالب الكردية الخاصة بالتجنيس فقط على أن يتم ذلك بشكل لا يغير من الوضع في الدولة والمجتمع وعدم تخريب التوازنات القائمة في الواقع الراهن وهذه الاستجابة من أجل تجنيدهم وكذلك لاستبعاد توجههم المؤكد في استقبال قوات أجنبية معادية فيما لو زادت الاحتجاجات المعادية عن المتوقع. فالمنطقة الشمالية الشرقية هي الثغرة الوحيدة من هذه الناحية, أما بقية المناطق فلا يوجد احتمال قبول هذا الأمر.
- إصدار السفارات السورية في الخارج ووزارة الخارجية السورية لتطمينات مستمرة لأمريكا والدول الأوربية وتذكيرهم بإمكانية تعرض الاستقرار على جبهة الجولان للاهتزاز في حال وصل المتطرفون وأمسكوا بزمام الأمور.
- مراقبة السفارة السورية في جميع الدول للسوريين وتصرفاتهم وسلوكياتهم /على وزارة الخارجية التصرف بهذا الشأن/

المناطق الساخنة المتوقعة: درعا – دير الزور – حماة – بانياس – وبعض الأحياء المتفرقة من مدن أخرى.
الحاجات:
تجهيز الطواقم الأمنية والإعلامية الضرورية للتنفيذ في أسرع وقت ممكن وبشكل سري للغاية.
ملاحظة: الخطة التفصيلية الكاملة لا توضع أبدأ بين يدي أحد أو أي طاقم من طواقم العمل. ولكن يتم تجزئتها إلى فروع وأقسام.

Syrian Gov Secret Plan Page 2Syrian Gov Secret Plan Page 2

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PLEASE SHARE. It may not be strictly Wikileaks but ArabLeaks was inspired by them, and this documentation could be used as evidence in an international court to prove the Assad regime guilty of crimes against humanity.

Iran presses Syria over missing journalist

kohenari:

In what has to be one of the more bizarre moments for those with an interest in media and human rights, the government of Iran — well-known for the detention of foreign journalists — called for the government of Syria to investigate the disappearance of Dorothy Parvaz, an Al Jazeera journalist, who holds American, Canadian, and Iranian citizenship and traveled to Damascus on her Iranian passport.

Ali Akbar Salehi, the Iranian foreign minister, said at a news conference in Doha on Monday that Iran wanted the Syrians to look into the matter.

“I hope that it is not true, but if that is the case, then we demand the government of Syria to look into this,” Salehi said in response to a question on what Iran would undertake to secure Parvaz’s release.

Most recently, Syria confirmed Parvaz’s detention. No word yet from Iran on next steps, with regard to the Parvaz case or their own long-standing position on detaining foreign journalists.

HT: James Pauley.

Syrian protesters plan ‘day of rage’ :: www.uruknet.info :: informazione dal medio oriente :: information from middle east :: [vs-1]

—->


Syrian protesters plan ‘day of rage’

Associated Press

Syrian protesters plan ‘day of rage’

AP
February 1, 2011


Syrians are organising campaigns on Facebook and Twitter that call for a “day of rage” in the capital Damascus this week, taking inspiration from Egypt and Tunisia in using social networking sites to rally their followers for sweeping political reforms.

Like Egypt and Tunisia, Syria suffers from corruption, poverty and unemployment. All three nations have seen subsidy cuts on staples like bread and oil.

Syria’s auhoritarian president has resisted calls for political freedoms and jailed critics of his regime.

The main Syrian protest page on Facebook is urging people to protest in Damascus on February 4 and 5 for “a day of rage”. It says the goal is to “end the state of emergency in Syria and end corruption”.

The number of people who have joined Facebook and Twitter pages calling for protests on Friday and Saturday is still relatively small, and some are believed to live outside the country.

Social networking sites were integral to rallying protesters in Tunisia and Egypt.

Facebook is banned in Syria, which makes organising more difficult - even though many Syrians manage to access the social networking site anyway.

More than 2,500 people have joined the page calling for the protests, with another 850 joining a page in favour of President Bashar Assad.

Mr Assad, a 45-year-old British-trained eye doctor, inherited power from his father Hafez in 2000 after three decades of authoritarian rule.

He has since moved slowly to lift Soviet-style economic restrictions, letting in foreign banks, throwing the doors open to imports and empowering the private sector.

But Mr Assad has not matched liberal economics with political reforms and critics of the regime are routinely locked up, drawing an outcry from international human rights groups.
:: Article nr. 74510 sent on 01-feb-2011 21:02 ECT
www.uruknet.info?p=74510

Link: www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/syrian-protesters-plan-day-of-rage-
   2201115.html

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